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September 4, 2019

Commercial Energy Consumers Association of British Columbia
c/o Owen Bird Law Corporation
P.O. Box 49130
Three Bentall Centre
2900 – 595 Burrard Street
Vancouver, BC
V7X 1J5

Attention: Mr. Christopher P. Weafer

Dear Mr. Weafer:

Re: FortisBC Energy Inc. (FEI)

Project No. 1598988

Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the Inland Gas Upgrade Project (the Application)

Response to the Commercial Energy Consumers Association of British Columbia (CEC) Information Request (IR) No. 3

On December 17, 2018, FEI filed the Application referenced above. In accordance with British Columbia Utilities Commission Order G-153-19 setting out a further Regulatory Timetable for the review of the Application, FEI respectfully submits the attached response to CEC IR No. 3.

If further information is required, please contact the undersigned.

Sincerely,

FORTISBC ENERGY INC.

Original signed:

Doug Slater

Attachments

cc (email only): Commission Secretary
Registered Parties

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1 **44. Reference: Transcript #1 page 46-47 and page 48**

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MR. CHERNIKHOWSKY: First of all, I don't think we are
saying that it is exactly the same. What we're saying

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is it can be exactly the same, and the corrosion
mechanism is independent of the age of the pipeline,
whether it's 60-year old construction, it's 60-year
old steel, or 20-year old construction and 20-year old
steel. The mechanism of corrosion is the same.
Fundamentally the steel is not really any different
over the years. Yes, the construction methods may
have changed, but the steel that actually composes the
pipeline wall hasn't. And so it is still appropriate
to use that same assumption regardless of the age of
the pipeline.

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MR. BALMER: I'd say type of coating is a factor that
is considered by industry, but as we've presented is
that there are factors other than coating that can
impact the presence of corrosion, such as rocks. And
so the uncertainty is such that it's not sufficient
indicator for us to rely on for future performance.

And that is consistent with industry practice.

44.1 Please discuss the changes in construction methods over time and how they
would impact the corrosion of the various laterals.

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1 **Response:**

2 Changes in construction methods have occurred since the time of FEI's original transmission
3 pipeline installations beginning in the 1950s to the present day, with potential impacts on
4 corrosion. These changes include the following:

- 5 • Backfill materials: In early pipeline construction, fill materials sourced locally from the site
6 of the pipeline were primarily used for backfill regardless of the fill type and quality.
7 Backfill materials included all types of soils, as well as large rocks, construction debris,
8 and organic material, all of which can impact pipeline coatings (e.g. through physical
9 damage) and the application of cathodic protection (e.g. through cathodic protection
10 shielding) to prevent active corrosion. Today, backfill is engineered for lifecycle integrity
11 of the pipeline system, which may necessitate the use of non-locally sourced fill
12 materials;
- 13 • Pipe Handling: In early pipeline construction, handling of pipe during installation was not
14 monitored with the same level of inspection that it is today. Today, full time inspectors
15 are utilized such that pipeline or coating damage is identified and repaired prior to
16 backfill; and
- 17 • Quality Control Inspection: Inspection of pipeline installation has evolved from no
18 inspection to full time inspection. Today, full time inspectors monitor and observe all
19 aspects of construction from pipe transportation, handling, welding, laying, coating and
20 backfilling.

21
22 The selected alternatives for the 29 Transmission Laterals can be used to manage external
23 corrosion over the long-term regardless of the construction methods used. In-line inspection
24 data enables targeted replacements or repairs on specific locations along a pipeline that may be
25 experiencing active corrosion. The PRS and PLR alternatives both provide effective mitigation
26 of rupture due to external corrosion by operating the pipeline at less than 30 percent of SMYS.

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30 44.2 Please discuss the various coatings used over time, and how these impact the
31 corrosion of the various laterals.

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33 **Response:**

34 Coatings used in the pipeline industry have evolved over time in terms of application,
35 performance and failure mechanism:

- 36 • Coal tar or asphalt enamel coatings, both factory applied and field applied, were
37 common in early pipeline construction up to the mid-1960s. Coal tar and asphalt enamel

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1 coatings have had mixed performance in their long-term capability to mitigate active
2 corrosion, with field-applied coatings tending to have a greater number of issues.
3 Factors affecting the performance of these field-applied coatings include surface
4 preparation, pipe temperature, material temperature, application technique (pouring vs.
5 mopping), use of primer, use of reinforcing fibre mats, and backfill. Cold applied asphalt
6 adhesive tapes were also used for field application on girth welds in the 1950s;

- 7 • In the mid-1960s, two-layer polyethylene factory-applied coatings became more
8 common in the industry. While this factory-applied coating has generally demonstrated
9 reasonable long-term performance, issues with field-coated girth welds on pipelines of
10 this vintage have not been uncommon. Cold applied tapes with bitumen adhesive as
11 well as synthetic butyl rubber adhesive became more prevalent and exclusively used as
12 field applied girth weld coatings on two-layer polyethylene factory applied coatings;
- 13 • In the 1970s, cold-applied butyl rubber adhesive polymer backed tapes were
14 increasingly used. Application of these tapes tended not to be closely monitored and
15 primers to aid with adhesion of the tapes were not always used. These tapes typically
16 fail by losing adhesion. This causes voids where water (e.g. moisture found in soil) can
17 contact the pipe wall resulting in corrosion, while at the same time shielding the cathodic
18 protection current from reaching the pipe surface. In the mid to late 1970s, cold-applied
19 tapes first evolved to hot-applied tapes, and then later to heat-shrinkable sleeves.
20 These later products only marginally improved performance and are associated with
21 coating failure mechanisms that can result in CP shielding;
- 22 • Starting in the early 1990s, quality control inspection of coating application became more
23 common. Although this inspection reduced the failure rate of these products, consistency
24 of application procedures and subsequent coating performance remained an issue in the
25 pipeline industry; and
- 26 • More recently, from the mid 1990s, the pipeline industry has generally moved to
27 products such as liquid-applied epoxies that have been assessed as “fail-safe” (i.e. they
28 will not shield cathodic protection current from reaching the steel pipe surface in the
29 event of future coating failure). Although epoxies can still fail, they are expected to fail in
30 a manner where cathodic protection remains effective in providing corrosion protection
31 to the steel pipeline.

32
33 FEI’s evidence from its in-line inspection-driven integrity digs is that cathodic protection
34 shielding is an issue throughout its system, over a range of pipeline coating types and
35 installation years. As such, FEI is obligated to adopt improved methods where available and
36 consistent with industry practice for managing the hazard of external corrosion.



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2 44.3 If available, please provide a list of laterals associating the differing construction
3 methods and coatings.

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5 **Response:**

6 FEI's historical records do not identify the specific construction methods employed for each of
7 the 29 Transmission Laterals. Please refer to Table 4 from FEI's response to BCUC IR 1.8.2 for
8 a list of the 29 Transmission Laterals with their year of installation, along with their predominant
9 pipe and joint coating types.

10 As discussed in the responses to CEC IRs 3.44.1 and 3.44.2, both construction methods and
11 coatings have evolved over time, each with potential impacts to external corrosion. In FEI's
12 experience, the associated impacts of historical practices are not necessarily systemic, nor are
13 correlations between construction timeframes or practices specifically identifiable; instead, they
14 typically result in compromised performance of a single pipeline. For example, to date the only
15 FEI example of a systemic (but still localized to a single pipeline) concern is the NPS 20
16 Coquitlam Gate IP gas line which was the subject of the Lower Mainland Intermediate Pressure
17 System Upgrade Project. In that project, FEI received approval for replacement of the entire
18 pipeline due to demonstrated coating issues at field-coated weld joints along its entire length,
19 and the inability to further localize the resulting corrosion locations. It is much more common for
20 corrosion to occur only at isolated locations along a pipeline.

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1 **45. Reference: Exhibit B-17, PDF page 3/150 and Transcript 1 pages 11-12**

Further to the update provided for Q1 2019, the following activities have been undertaken by FEI during Q2 2019:

- October 2018 – present: FEI’s contracts with JANA Corporation pertaining to integrity data improvements and Quantitative Risk Assessment are progressing. FEI’s first iteration of a segment-by-segment risk assessment process will be demonstrated through this work. FEI has been, and will continue to work closely with JANA through completion of these contracts, which is expected by year-end 2019.
- April 16, 2019: FEI and JANA delivered presentations to the BC Utilities Commission staff and Interveners on its planned Transmission Integrity Management Capabilities (TIMC) Project, which is anticipated to provide required upgrades for enabling in-line inspection with crack-detection (EMAT) tools or alternate crack-management strategies that may be deemed preferable through FEI’s analysis. JANA’s presentations comprised a general overview of quantitative risk assessments as well as updates on both the integrity data improvements and FEI’s quantitative risk assessment. Copies of these presentations are attached.
- Preliminary documentation (e.g. methodology) has been made available by JANA for FEI review beginning in Q2 2019.
- Preliminary results have been presented by JANA to FEI in Q2 2019.

Further technical workshops are being scheduled between FEI and JANA representatives for Q3 2019 to confirm technical defensibility and documentation of these results are in line with FEI’s expectation. FEI expects to meet with the BC OGC to review the results of the first iteration Quantitative Risk Assessment in Q4 2019 or Q1 2020.

FEI will submit its next update in Q4 2019 for the preceding quarter.

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4 45.1 Please provide a summary of the preliminary results.

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6 **Response:**

7 Please refer to the response to BCUC IR 3.66.3.

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11 45.2 At what stage is the ‘First Iteration’ of the QRA at present?

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13 **Response:**

14 The data collection and analysis portions of the first draft iteration QRA have been completed by
15 JANA, and review of this draft submission will be undertaken by FEI over the coming months.

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1 45.3 Has FEI scheduled the appointment with the BC OGC? If yes, please provide
2 the date.

3

4 **Response:**

5 FEI has not yet scheduled the appointment with the BC OGC to review the first iteration of the
6 Quantitative Risk Assessment.

7

8

9

10 45.4 What outcomes does FEI expect from its meeting with the BC OGC? Please
11 explain.

12

13 **Response:**

14 FEI expects that it will be able to demonstrate to the BC OGC that FEI has developed and
15 implemented a segment-by-segment risk assessment process to determine the risk associated
16 with its pipeline assets in BC. Therefore, FEI expects that the outcome of the meeting will be
17 that the BC OGC would advise FEI that no further submissions are required related to the BC
18 OGC's risk assessment finding identified during the 2014 Integrity management program
19 assessment.

20

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23 45.5 Please comment, with quantification to the extent possible, on the likely
24 increases in risks that could accrue if the Commission decision were to be
25 deferred:

26 A) until after the FEI has met with BC OGC; and

27 B) for 1 year.

28

29 **Response:**

30 As explained in the response to CEC IR 2.40.1, FEI is exposed to increased risk due to any
31 deferral of the IGU Project. Until the IGU Project is completed, there will continue to be the
32 potential for significant regulatory, safety, reliability and environmental consequences in the
33 event of a pipeline rupture due to external corrosion.

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2 45.6 Please comment, with quantification to the extent possible, on the likely savings
3 in costs that could accrue if the Commission decision were to be deferred for 1, 2
4 or 3 years.

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6 **Response:**

7 FEI is unable to identify any likely cost savings that could accrue if the Commission decision
8 were to be deferred for 1, 2 or 3 years. Under the project scope as presented in the Application,
9 deferring the Project for 1, 2 or 3 years would result in higher capital costs when taking into
10 account inflation.

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1 **46. Reference: Transcript Volume 1 pages 11-12**

 So here is a zoomed in, 3D view, and it shows a portion of a condominium complex in Kelowna, and these are the buildings in the bottom. It is an adult community with over 200 units in four residential buildings. Effectively we are seeing two of them here. And again, you can see the Kelowna 1 Loop pipeline corridor. These are the red lines.

2

 Now, when we talk of pipeline ruptures, one of the things we can calculate is the so-called potential impact radius, if an ignition occurs. And this is defined as, the radius of a circle within which the potential failure of a pipeline could have a significant impact on people or property. In other words, at the edge of the circle, there is a one percent chance of mortality, and that risk increases as one approaches the centre. It is a fairly simple calculation and it is based on the pipeline diameter and operating pressure, and it is explained in the Gas Research Institute Reference cited in the response to CEC IR 1.3.2.

 In the case of the Kelowna 1 Loop, that PIR, potential impact radius, works out to about 140 feet, and would encompass much of one of the buildings in that complex. As mentioned, individuals within this radius would expect serious injuries or worse.

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46.1 Has FEI conducted any assessments of the highest potential impacts from ruptures?

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1 **Response:**

2 FEI has not conducted any explicit assessments of the highest potential impacts from ruptures
3 at this time. The localized example used by Mr. Chernikhowsky during the Procedural
4 Conference was for illustrative purposes only. Given that a rupture of a transmission pipeline
5 operating over 30 percent SMYS can have significant safety, reliability, environmental and
6 regulatory consequences, regardless of the failure location, there is no identified benefit from
7 conducting such an assessment as part of the IGU Project.

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9

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11 46.1.1 If yes, please provide.

12

13 **Response:**

14 Please refer to the response to CEC IR 3.46.1.

15

16

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18 46.1.2 If not, please explain why not?

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20 **Response:**

21 Please refer to the response to CEC IR 3.46.1.

22

23

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25 46.2 Please comment, with quantification if possible, on the potential for cost savings
26 to accrue if FEI were able to prioritize transmission laterals according to overall
27 risk, such that the project could be conducted over a period of time five years
28 longer than is currently planned.

29

30 **Response:**

31 FEI is unable to identify any cost savings by conducting the Project over a period of time five
32 years longer than is currently planned. The current Project schedule was developed based on
33 regional distributions of the 29 Transmission Laterals, cost efficiency, and other constraints as
34 discussed in the response to BCUC IR 1.3.1. Therefore, if the Project were to be completed
35 over a longer period of time, FEI expects the project capital costs to be higher taking into



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1 account lost efficiencies and cost inflation. Since Project capital cost savings are not expected
2 under this scenario, FEI did not develop a cost estimate or conduct a financial analysis to
3 determine the actual change in the present value (PV) of incremental revenue requirements
4 over the 66-year analysis period.

5 Further, as FEI discussed in the response to BCUC IR 1.3.1, it has limited ability to prioritize
6 amongst the laterals based on risk level because the condition information on these laterals
7 does not provide any indication of localized issues on any particular lateral. FEI's assessment
8 is that there is no material difference in the overall integrity risk level of the laterals as they are
9 subject to the same potential for rupture due to external corrosion that may go undetected by
10 FEI's current integrity management techniques. FEI's integrity assessments do not provide
11 information to suggest there would be material improvement from a safety or reliability
12 perspective by prioritizing the laterals differently from currently planned.

13

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1 **47. Reference: Exhibit B-17, PDF page 61/150**

2 **Risk Based Asset and Integrity
Management Framework**



- System QRA outputs used to guide decision making process for identifying required crack management capabilities and potential system upgrades
- As all threats considered in QRA, also used to identify other potential threat management approaches that may be required

2

3 47.1 Please discuss the 'other potential threat management approaches' that may be
4 required.

5

6 **Response:**

7 JANA Corporation provides the following response:

8 In addition to running EMAT ILI to manage cracking threats, other threats could
9 be identified for potential future mitigations that would be applied independently
10 of EMAT ILI as FEI transitions to risk based Integrity Management, such as
11 threats in the five hazard categories in FEI's IMP-P process:

- 12 ○ Third Party Damage:
- 13 ▪ Potential additional third-party damage mitigation (beyond current
14 measures, e.g. increase in depth of cover, additional signage,
15 etc.)
- 16 ○ Natural Hazards:
- 17 ▪ Potential additional mitigations for ground movement (beyond
18 current measures, e.g. ground stabilization)
- 19 ○ Pipe Condition:
- 20 ▪ Corrosion threats currently managed using MFL ILI, crack threats
21 to be addressed through EMAT ILI
- 22 ○ Material Defects & Equipment Failures
- 23 ▪ Potential additional preventative maintenance
- 24 ○ Human Factors
- 25 ▪ Potential additional mitigative actions (e.g., training, etc.)
- 26